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JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH IN SOUTH EAST ASIA:

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................... i

I. INTRODUCTION ..........................................................................................................1

II. THE NETWORK IN AFGHANISTAN........................................................................ 2

A. THE KEY FIGURES ................................................................................................................2

B. IMPORTANCE OF THE BATTLE OF JAJI, APRIL 1987................................................................4

C. THE “MILITARY ACADEMY AND ITS OFFSHOOTS ................................................................4

D. THE AFGHAN ALUMNI ..........................................................................................................7

III. CONSOLIDATION OF THE STRUCTURE............................................................ 11

IV. THE MAKASSAR BOMBS......................................................................................... 13

A. WAHDAH ISLAMIYAH..................................                ......................14

B. PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTING THE BOMBING ...................................................................15

V. TRAINING IN MINDANAO....................................................................................... 16

A. CAMP HUDAIBIYAH ............................................................................................................17

B. THE SOLO NETWORK ..........................................................................................................18

C. THE SULAWESI NETWORK ..................................................................................................19

D. THE BANTEN GROUP...........................................................................................................22

E. PUTTING THE TRAINING TO USE..........................................................................................23

VI. THE ROLE OF PREMAN........................................................................................... 24

VII. SCHOOL AND MARRIAGE: THE TIES THAT BIND.......................................... 26

A. THE PESANTREN NETWORK OF JI ........................................................................................26

1. The JI “Ivy League” .................................................................................................26

2. The Hidayatullah network .......................................................................................26

3. Other pesantrens linked to JI ...................................................................................27

B. MARRIAGE ALLIANCES .......................................................................................................27

VIII. CONNECTIONS TO AL-QAEDA ............................................................................. 29

IX. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 31

APPENDICES

B. SUSPECTS IN INDONESIA BOMBINGS LINKED TO JI ..............................................................33

C. SOME SENIOR JI MEMBERS STILL AT LARGE .......................................................................36

D. INDEX OF NAMES ................................................................................................................37

JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH IN SOUTH EAST ASIA:

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the South East Asian terrorist organization based in Indonesia, remains active and dangerous, despite the mid-August 2003 arrest of Hambali, one of its top operatives.

Though more than 200 men linked or suspected of links to it are now in custody in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines, JI is far from destroyed. Indonesian police and their international counterparts have succeeded in seriously damaging the network, but the bombing of the J.W. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta on 5 August provided clear evidence that the organization remains capable of planning and executing a major operation in a large urban centre.

The information emerging from the interrogation of JI suspects indicates that this is a bigger organization than previously thought, with a depth of leadership that gives it a regenerative capacity. It has communication with and has received funding from al-Qaeda, but it is very much independent and takes most, if not all operational decisions locally. New information suggests that JI was deliberately set up as a military organization and that the division into units known as mantiqis and wakalahs – originally defined as districts and sub districts – was actually a territorial command structure of brigades, battalions, companies, platoons, and squads.

All senior members of the central command trained in Afghanistan in the late 1980s and early 1990s, before JI formally existed. It was in the camps of the Saudi-financed Afghan mujahidin leader Abdul Rasul Sayyaf that they developed jihadist fervor, international contacts, and deadly skills. Afghanistan veterans became the trainers of a new generation of mujahidin when JI set up a camp in Mindanao from 1996 to 2000 in a reciprocal arrangement with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The recruits trained in everything from explosives to sharp-shooting and included not only JI members but also members of like-minded jihadist organizations from other parts of Indonesia, especially South Sulawesi and West Java. This means that Indonesia has to worry about other organizations as well, whose members have equally lethal skills but do not operate under the JI command structure. This background report describes the emergence of one such organization in South Sulawesi that was responsible for the bombing of a McDonald’s restaurant and a car showroom in Makassar in December 2002. The JI network is held together not just by ideology and training but also by an intricate network of marriages that at times makes it seems like a giant extended family. Insufficient attention has been paid to the role the women of JI play in cementing the network. In many cases, senior JI leaders arranged the marriages of their subordinates to their own sisters or sisters-in-law to keep the network secure.

JI also depends on a small circle of pesantrens – Muslim boarding schools – to propagate jihadist teachings. Of the more than 14,000 such schools in Indonesia, only a tiny number are committed to jihadist principles, but there is a kind of JI “Ivy League” to which JI members send their own children. Chief among these is Pesantren al-Mukmin, better known as Pondok Ngruki, whose founder, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, is believed to have been JI’s amir or top leader between late 1999 and 2002.

JI thus remains dangerous. The arrests of Hambali and others surely have weakened its ability to operate, and the Indonesian police and their international counterparts have made major progress in hunting down its members. But this is an organization spread across a huge archipelago, whose members probably number in the thousands. No single individual is indispensable.

The one piece of good news is that there are some indications that internal dissent is building within JI. Members are said to be unhappy with recent choices of targets, including the Marriott hotel bombing that killed mostly Indonesian workers. There is disagreement about the appropriate focus for jihad and over the use of a practice known as fa’i – robbery of non-Muslims to support Islamic struggle. Internal dissent has destroyed more than one radical group, but in the short term, we are likely to see more JI attacks.

JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH IN SOUTH EAST ASIA:

DAMAGED BUT STILL DANGEROUS

I. INTRODUCTION

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) remains active and dangerous from its Indonesian base despite the recent arrests of some of its top operatives. On 5 August 2003, members of the South East Asian terrorist organization bombed the Marriott hotel in Jakarta, clear evidence that JI is still capable of planning and executing a major operation in the heart of the capital.

Just a week later, one of JI’s most senior leaders and the most wanted man in South East Asia, Riduan Isamuddin alias Hambali, was arrested in Thailand, joining some 200 men linked or suspected of links to JI who are now in custody.

Hambali’s arrest was unquestionably a major blow: he was JI’s top link to al-Qaeda and one of its major strategists and fund-raisers. But he was not indispensable, and JI is far from destroyed. Indications from the interrogation of JI suspects suggest JI is larger than first believed, with a depth of leaders that allows it to make up losses and regenerate itself. The significance of the arrest will thus depend in part on the information that Hambali discloses and how that information is acted on, but JI does not depend on one man.

If some early accounts painted JI as an al-Qaeda affiliate, tightly integrated with the bin Laden network, the reality is more complex. JI has elements in common with al-Qaeda, particularly its jihadist ideology and a long period of shared experience in Afghanistan. Its leaders revere bin Laden and seek to emulate him, and they have almost certainly received direct financial support from al-Qaeda.

But JI is not operating simply as an al-Qaeda subordinate. Virtually all of its decision-making and much of its fund-raising has been conducted locally, and its focus, for all the claims about its wanting to establish a South East Asian caliphate, continues to be on establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia.1 If, since 11 September 2001, and particularly since the Bali bombings, the aim has seemed more destructive than constructive, especially in terms of attacking the U.S. and its allies as the biggest enemies of Islam, the emphasis on jihad in Indonesia remains strong.

Documentary evidence from the mid-1990s and more recent interrogation of JI suspects suggest that JI has a rigidly hierarchical structure headed by an amir. In practice, however, members of the central command, the markaziyah, appear to be more important in setting policy and deciding on operations and are not constrained by the formal hierarchy. JI also maintains alliances with a loose network of like-minded regional organizations all committed in different ways to jihad.

The Makassar bombings of 5 December 2002 were not the work of JI, for example, but they were carried out by men who had been trained by JI in Mindanao and who had the motivation, manpower, and skills to undertake a JI-like attack. JI has also made very pragmatic use of thugs (preman) as necessary, particularly in Ambon.  Both the core organization and this looser network

Wan Min bin Wan Mat, a JI suspect detained in Malaysia, told interrogators that once an Islamic state in Indonesia was achieved, members would work toward a larger daulah islamiyah nusantara encompassing Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines, and then move on to restoring the Islamic caliphate. Wan Min interrogation deposition, 11 March 2003.

are bound together by history, ideology, education, and marriage. They share a commitment to implementing salafi teachings – a return to the “pure” Islam practiced by the Prophet – and to jihad. More than 200 members trained in Afghanistan from 1985 to 1995 and even more than that in Mindanao from 1996 to 2001. These bonds are likely to enable the network to survive police efforts to dismantle it.

It is sobering in particular to note that several leaders in the central command have not been identified, let alone apprehended. Senior figures with proven capacity to do serious damage, such as Zulkarnaen, the head of JI military operations, and the Malaysian national, Zulkifli bin Hir alias Musa alias Marwan, remain at large in the region, and the cell structure is probably more extensive than originally believed.

This report examines the ties that bind members of JI and its associate networks together, particularly the Afghanistan and Mindanao experiences, and assesses JI’s potential for conducting operations.

It is based on examination of interrogation depositions of many of the suspects arrested in connection with the Bali bombings as well as confidential interviews with people close to the network. The former are valuable documents but ICG does not take the information within them at face value; several Bali suspects, in particular, have given misleading information to interrogators. But through cross-checking different accounts of the same incident, it is possible to get a reasonably reliable description of events.

II. THE NETWORK IN AFGHANISTAN

All of JI’s top leaders and many of the men involved in JI bombings trained in Afghanistan over a ten-year period, 1985-95. The jihad in Afghanistan had a huge influence in shaping their worldview, reinforcing their commitment to jihad, and providing them with lethal skills. Their experience there was also critical in terms of forging bonds among themselves and building an international network that included members of al- Qaeda. It is important to note that the process of sending recruits to Afghanistan began at least seven years before JI formally came into being. In many ways, the emergence of a formal organization around 1992 merely institutionalized a network that already existed. Once JI was formed, however, the Afghanistan veterans became its elite.

A. THE KEY FIGURES

How many Indonesians trained in Afghanistan may never be known. One veteran estimated about 3,000, which is certainly too high.  Those who later became JI were far fewer. One man said that their aim was to reach 300, the number of the Prophet’s Companions, and they never quite made it.  This latter group had some very specific attributes. With a few exceptions, they were followers of Abdullah Sungkar, the man who together with Abu Bakar Ba’asyir founded Pesantren al-Mukmin, better known as Pondok Ngruki, in Solo, Central Java in 1971.  The Sungkar connection meant they were also committed in one way or another to continuing the struggle of the Darul Islam movement to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia. And all trained in a camp led by Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, the Afghan mujahidin commander with the weakest network inside Afghanistan and the closest ties with Saudi Arabia. Each of these factors influenced the kind of training they received. Sungkar and other Darul Islam leaders began recruiting volunteers for Afghanistan in 1985 (or in some cases ordering their followers

2 “Tiga Ribu Anggota JI Belum Tertangkap”, jawapos.com, 15 July 2003.

3 IRS interview, March 2003.

4  The Case of the “Ngruki Network” in Indonesia, August 2002.

to sign up). If the recruits already had a commitment to an Islamic state, rooted in Darul Islam, political developments at home reinforced it. Soeharto, then Indonesian president, had alienated many Muslims in 1982-1983 by his “sole foundation” (azas tunggal) policy, by which all Islamic organizations had to declare that five principles called Pancasila, and not Islam, was their sole ideological foundation. Then in 1984, a rally in Tanjung Priok, Jakarta, by Muslims angered by both this policy and the desecration of a local mosque turned violent. The army opened fire, and many dozens were killed. Fury over the Tanjung Priok riot may have aided recruitment.5 Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir were forced to flee to Malaysia in 1985 when the Supreme Court reversed a lower court decision, and they faced immediate imprisonment.6 From exile, they decided they needed to strengthen their movement through building up its military capacity. Sending their followers to Afghanistan was the means to this end.7 As it happened, 1985 also marked the beginning of the bloodiest year in the entire Afghan war; Gorbachev had come to power in March that year and given the Soviet army one year to achieve what had eluded it in the previous six: victory.8 Recruitment of non-Afghan mujahidin, most Arab but some South East Asian, by Saudi-funded agencies intensified. One of those agencies was the Muslim World League, or the Rabitat al-Alam al- Islami, often called simply the “Rabitah”.9 In Indonesia and then in Malaysia after Sungkar and Ba’asyir fled there, it was the Rabitah that channelled funds for many, but not all, Indonesian

5 Berita Acara Pemeriksaan Ahmad Sajuli, 30 October 2002. Sajuli lived in Tanjung Priok and frequently attended lectures by some of those involved in the riot.

6 Sungkar and Ba’asyir were arrested on subversion charges in November 1978 and accused of working to establish an Islamic state. They were finally tried in 1982, sentenced to time served and released, but the prosecution appealed to the Supreme Court to reinstate the original sentence of nine years. In early 1985, the Court finally ruled in favor of the prosecution and ordered their rearrest. See ICG Briefing, The Ngruki Network, op. cit.

7 Trial documents in the case of Muzahar Muhtar, Berkas Perkara, Tindak Pidana Subversi, Tersangka Muzahar Muhtar alias Taslim alias Musa, Kejaksaan Tinggi DKI Jakarta, Nomor 13/r.Dik.Sus-5/8/86. 8 Barnett R. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, 2nd edition (New Haven, 2002), p. 146. 9 Ibid, p. 197.

recruits.10 Mukhlas, a JI leader indicted in the Bali bombings, for example, says he went at his own expense. All recruits were sent through the “services centre” (Maktab al-Khidmat) in Peshawar, set up in 1984 to provide the non-Afghan mujahidin logistical support. The Maktab was headed by Abdullah Azzam, a Jordanian-Palestinian whom Osama bin Laden regarded as a mentor and who became the chief ideologue of al-Qaeda.11 Mukhlas acknowledges Azzam as a major influence on his thinking, and many of his writings have been translated into Indonesian by Pustaka al-Alaq, a publishing house linked to Pondok Ngruki in Solo.12 Until the Soviet army withdrew from Afghanistan, the Indonesians sent by Sungkar all went through Azzam’s centre on their way to Camp Saddah, the Sayyaf facility in Khumran Agency, in Parachinar, Pakistan, on the border with Afghanistan.13 Sayyaf, head of the Afghan faction called the Islamic Union for the Freedom of Afghanistan (Ittihad-i Islami Bara-yi Azadi-yi Afghanistan), was a proponent of very strict salafi Islam and had the full support of the Saudi religious establishment at the time Indonesian recruitment began. (Sungkar seems to have known him quite well, but it is not clear where they met.) Sayyaf was not only the mujahidin commander with the closest ties to the Saudis; he was also closest to Osama bin Laden.

From the beginning of his interest in Afghanistan, bin Laden had associated himself with Sayyaf and was active in helping with the international

10 The vice-chairman of Rabitah at the time was Mohammed Natsir, a leading figure in Masyumi, a Muslim political party that was eventually banned by Sukarno. Natsir was also the founder in 1967 of the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, the Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council.

11 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban ( New Haven, 2000), p. 131.

12 These include Hijrah dan I’dad, published February 2002; Pelita Yang Hilang and Tarbiyah Jihadiyah, Vols 1- 12, published 1994. Al-Alaq proudly describes itself as “disseminator of jihadist thought” (penyebar fikrah jihad).

13 Peter L. Bergen, Holy War, Inc. (New York, 2002), p.

14. Many Indonesians and Filipinos received training at camps – muaskar tadrib in Arabic – run by other mujahidin leaders, such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Yunus Khalis, Jamil al-Rahman, and Jalaluddin Haqqani. Hekmatyar, in particular, was training South East Asians as early as 1982, according to Ahmed Rashid. Communication with ICG, June 2003. The men who became JI, however, were exclusively with Sayyaf.

recruitment of mujahidin. The early Sungkar recruits would all likely have met bin Laden through Sayyaf, and Mukhlas acknowledges proudly having done so.14

B. IMPORTANCE OF THE BATTLE OF JAJI,

APRIL 1987

Indeed, Mukhlas claims to have taken part with bin Laden in a turning point of the Afghan war, the battle of Jaji, near Khost (sometimes grandly referred to as the Battle of the Lion’s Den) in April 1987 that Abdullah Azzam says lasted 22 days. It stopped a Soviet advance and has entered mujahidin legend. Bin Laden was certainly there; so were Abdullah Azzam and Sayyaf, at one point taking refuge together in a tunnel constructed by the mujahidin specifically to protect from air strikes.15 Mukhlas told interrogators: In 1987 I met Sheikh Osama bin Laden in Joji, Afghanistan, when it was being attacked by Russia; the snow was two metres high,” Mukhlas told interrogators. “When the mujahidin went on attack, I went with them, and it was Osama bin Laden who […] led the mujahidin.16

The significance of the Indonesian presence at the battle of Jaji should not be underestimated. In addition to Mukhlas, the men who were to become top JI leaders and were in the Sayyaf camp at the time included Zulkarnaen, head of JI military operations (still at large); Hambali; Thoriqudin alias Abu Rusdan, believed to have replaced Abu Bakar Ba’asyir as JI amir, arrested in April 2003;  Jabir alias Enjang Bastaman, killed in Bandung in the Christmas Eve 2000 bombings; Mustopa, head of Mantiqi III, arrested in July 2003; and Mustaqim, a Ngruki teacher who ran the JI training academy in Mindanao and became director of the military department of Majelis Mujahidin

14 Berkas Perkara No. Pol. BP/06/II/2003 Dit Reskrim Ali Gufron alias Muklas, Interrogation deposition of Ali Gufron alias Muklas, 13 December. 2002.

15 Milton Beardon, “Afghanistan, Graveyard of Empires”, Foreign Affairs, November-December 2001, p. 17, and Abdullah Azzam, Runtuh Khilafah, (Pustaka al-Alaq, Solo, 1994), pp. 68-69.

16 Berkas Perkara No. Pol. BP/06/II/2003 Dit Reskrim Ali Gufron alias Muklas, Interrogation deposition of Ali Gufron alias Muklas, 13 Dec. 2002.

Indonesia, the Indonesian Mujahidin Council.17

A man who never became a JI member but nonetheless was central to its activities, Syawal Yasin, alias Laode Ida from Makassar, was also in Camp Saddah.

These men would not only have bonded as Indonesians in such a new and strange environment. (Several speak in wonder of the snow, for example.) They would also have been inspired by the epic battle and seen it as reaffirmation that their cause was just, although few would have actually taken part in the fighting, as Mukhlas apparently did. Sayyaf repeatedly told the non-Afghan recruits that they should not go to the front lines, that it was more important for them to return to their own countries, well trained for jihad, than to die in Afghanistan.18 The Jaji battle also may have been an occasion for more mingling of mujahidin from different countries than was ordinarily the case. For example, one participant was the then sixteen-year-old Ibnul Khattab, later known as the amir of international mujahidin in the Caucasus, who went on to play a major role in Chechnya.19 Another was Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Sayyaf’s secretary and “the shadow that never left his side”, who became a top al-Qaeda figure.20

C. THE “MILITARY ACADEMY AND ITS

OFFSHOOTS

Sungkar’s first group of recruits in 1985 was small, perhaps less than a dozen. They joined forces with some recruits from Gerakan Pemuda Islam (GPI), also sent through Rabitah auspices.21 The second group in 1986 was much larger, some 50 to 60 men. These first two groups had the hardest task because they had to build facilities for everyone else. Initially they had planned to construct a separate military academy near Peshawar, but the area was too crowded with refugees, and they got an offer from Sayyaf to conduct their training

17 The MMI was established in August 2000 with Abu Bakar Ba’asyir as head.

18 ICG interview with Afghanistan veteran, March 2003.

19 www.geocities.com/PicketFence/3131/alKhattab.htm.

20 “What Sheikh Abdullah Azzam said about Khalid Ash- Sheikh Muhammad”, 5 March 2003, Muslim News Online.

21 Abdul Qadir Jaelani, a well-known Muslim preacher (muballigh) in Jakarta, did the recruiting for GPI.

within Camp Saddah.22 Sayyaf provided the land, arms, and food; the Indonesians had to build the dormitories; a large kitchen; and training facilities, including an obstacle course.

The instructors for the first two groups were for the most part Afghans, Pakistanis, and Arabs. Sungkar appears to have been highly selective about the first Indonesians he sent. Most were well-educated, several from prestigious colleges such as Gajah Mada University in Yogyakarta or the Surabaya Institute of Technology, and they were fluent in Arabic or English. It was tactically smart. For one thing, these men translated the training materials, so they became the instructors for the Indonesians who followed. (Zulkarnaen and Syawal were two of these instructors.) For another, they were of such high quality that Sungkar’s reputation with Sayyaf was enhanced, increasing the funding for recruitment.23

Camp Saddah was divided into qabilah, the Arabic word for tribe. The South East Asians were considered one tribe, so Indonesians, Filipinos, Thais, and Malaysians trained together, with a combination of Malay and English as the languages of instruction. There was a Middle Eastern qabilah for Saudis, Egyptians, and Jordanians, and another for North Africans, particularly Algerians and Tunisians. There was not very much interaction among the different groups.

The full training program of religious and military instruction was three years, although shorter courses were available. The religious instruction was very much focused on salafi teachings, a return to the pure Islam practiced by the Prophet and his Companions. It emphasised aqidah (faith), tauhid (oneness of God) and most of all, jihad, using classic salafi texts such as those by Ibn Taymiyya.24

Abdullah Azzam’s writings, also taught in the camp, were a modern echo of Ibn Taymiyya’s arguments that jihad meant armed struggle and that it was legitimate to wage such a struggle against Muslims who deviated from the true Islam or refused to enforce the sharia (Islamic law). These teachings would have resonated with Indonesians from a Darul Islam background, whose efforts to uphold sharia, let alone establish an Islamic state, were repressed by the Soeharto government.

22 IRS interview with Afghanistan veteran, March 2003.

23 Ibid.

24 IRS interviews, March and June 2003.

One of the Indonesian veterans described the military component as follows: First was explosives. We were taught about the nature of explosives and their chemical composition. Then we moved on to the question of detonators, including how to blow up different kinds of targets. Second was mines: land mines and anti-tank mines. We studied how to take them apart, how to plant them, and how to repair them. Of course we also learned how to shoot and how to drive tanks. Third was map reading. This was the part I really loved. We got topography lessons, learned how to use a compass, and how to draw contour lines. This is important because if you are going to use artillery weapons, you have to know how to read maps. Fourth was infantry tactics or war tactics. We studied urban guerrilla warfare, guerrilla fighting in the mountains, attacks, ambushes and the like.25

The third and fourth group of recruits, about 25 men each, arrived in 1987. They were not only able to use all the facilities built by the first two groups, but they were also the beneficiaries of generous funding.

Each member reportedly got a monthly stipend of 300 Pakistani rupees, about Rp.30,000 at the 1987 exchange rate or U.S.$15. It was enough to live on, given that room and board were already covered.

The ceremony welcoming the fourth group was led by Mustafa Mashur, a top leader of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood whose books have been widely translated into bahasa Indonesia. Members of the fourth group also were the beneficiaries of a new “curriculum” including material not taught before such as sabotage. One instructor was an Egyptian, Muhammad Sauwki al-Istambuli, the elder brother of one of the killers of Anwar Sadat. Al-Istambuli, a leader of Gamma al-Islami, had fled Egypt after the assassination and come to Afghanistan around 1983 where he joined forces with Hekmatyar and Sayyaf. In the Sayyaf camp he was known as a particularly demanding trainer. “Even the toughest among the Indonesian mujahidin ended up vomiting and fainting whenthey were trained by him”, a veteran recalled.

Zulkarnaen, the man who became JI’s militaryleader, was a particular protégé.26

25 IRS interview, March 2003.

26 IRS interview, March 2003.

A fifth group, of about fifteen, arrived in 1988. That year, however, premier and mujahidin supporter Zia ul-Haq was killed and succeeded by Benazir Bhutto, who tried to expel the mujahidin from Pakistan. That coincided with the Soviet withdrawal, however, and the mujahidin just moved across the border, the Indonesians into a Sayyaf camp in Jaji, near Khost. Because of political uncertainties in Pakistan, no one came from Indonesia in 1989, but the pace picked up in 1990, with about 25 recruits.

The late 1980s and early 1990s were an important time for developing ties with like-minded individuals from other organisations who went through the Sayyaf camp, such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Abdurajak Janjalani of the Abu Sayyaf Group named his organisation after the camp’s patron; he apparently was there from some time in 1989 through December 1990.

The final group of recruits who received the full three-year training came in 1991. It appears to have been one of the largest groups, with many Malaysians and Singporeans as well as Indonesians. By then, fighting between the mujahidin had already broken out, the Soviets were gone, and not long afterwards, the funds from the Middle East started drying up. There was also a rift in the Indonesian ranks.

Sometime in 1992, the two senior leaders of the Darul Islam movement, Abdullah Sungkar and an Indonesia-based man, Ajengan Masduki, fell out.

Sungkar accused Masduki of having Shi’ite and sufi tendencies and therefore of having strayed from salafi teaching. The rift spilled over into Afghanistan when Sungkar flew to the Sayyaf camp to ask those there to choose between him and Masduki. Everyone chose him, save for one who abstained – Imam Samudra. It may not be a coincidence that Imam Samudra got to Afghanistan not through Abdullah Sungkar but through another DI leader, Gaos Taufik, who maintained good relations with Masduki. For fence-sitting, Imam Samudra was forced to leave before his three years were up.27 The rift between Sungkar and Masduki resulted directly in JI’s creation as an organisation separate and distinct from Darul Islam. In 1992, a mujahidin coalition government was set up

27 Ibid.

in Afghanistan under the leadership of Burhanuddin Rabbani, but to the huge disappointment of all the mujahidin, who saw their hopes for a true Islamic state being dashed, it quickly fell apart. Before the real warfare reached eastern Afghanistan, however, JI set up another camp in the hills outside Torkham. A veteran told ICG:

After the Najibullah regime fell, I think it was in 1993, Sheikh Rasul Sayyaf acquired an allotment of land in the area around Torkham.

Torkham is in a rocky, mountainous region and was very, very hot. We got permission from Sheikh Sayyaf to turn the land into a military training centre. We were freer here, not just because we could supervise ourselves but we could undertake any kind of training. Torkham was far from anywhere, so any kind of experiment was possible. You could blow up a mountain and it wouldn’t bother anybody. We had to sleep in tents, and it was even hotter.28

A leader of the reportedly extremely well-equipped camp was Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi, a Ngruki graduate and JI member. He had a reputation of being an extraordinary Qu’ran-reading teacher, as well as having well-honed military skills. (He has also consistently lied in his interrogation depositions. When one veteran learned that al-Ghozi had told interrogators he studied in Lahore from 1990 to 1994, the veteran laughed and said, “From 1990 to 1994, he was in Afghanistan without a break – if he studied, it was at Rasul Sayyaf University!”)29

Al-Ghozi became friends in Torkham with two MILF fighters, Salahudin and Habib, who worked with him on the Rizal Day bombing in Manila in December 2000.30 Indeed, it may have been here where the MILF leadership incurred an obligation to JI, in terms of having its members trained by JI instructors. Its decision to allow JI to set up its own camp within Camp Abu Bakar in Mindanao may have been simple reciprocity. In any case, it appears to have been al-Ghozi who was designated by the JI command to shift the training to Mindanao when fighting made further training in Afghanistan untenable.

28 IRS interview, March 2003.

29 IRS interview, April 2003.

30 Tactical Interrogation Report on Fathur Rohman al- Ghozi, January 2002.

D. THE AFGHAN ALUMNI

Some of the notable JI figures and associates among the Afghan alumni are the following:

1. The first class, 1985:

  Achmad Roihan alias Saad, who was arrested in April 2003 in Palu; he is the grandson of Achmad Dahlan, the founder of Muhammadiyah in Indonesia. He was also a Ngruki lecturer, and deputy to Abu Fatih (Abdullah Ansori), head of Mantiqi.

  Aris Sumarsono alias Zulkarnaen, JI’s top military trainer and currently a key member of the markaziyah or central command. He was in Pondok Ngruki in 1979, and his wife continues to live there. He has been named as a suspect in many JI bombings, including Bali.

Mohammed Faiq Hafidz, from Semarang, a member of the Sudirman mosque group in Yogyakarta, 1982-83, thus a close associate of Irfan Awwas Suryahardy, Fihiruddin alias Abu Jibril, and Muchliansyah alias Solihin, all of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia. Hafidz was detained as a JI member by Malaysia in January 2002.

  Syawal Yasin alias Laode Ida from Makassar. Syawal was recruited not through Abdullah Sungkar but through GPI and never became a JI member, although he appears to have been deeply involved in its activities. He was one of the most popular instructors for the South East Asians in the Sayyaf camp.

  Raja Husain alias Idris Acehnese, thought to have been involved in the bomb that went off at Soekarno-Hatta airport in late April 2003. He is believed to be based in Riau. Not clear whether he has been detained.

2. The second class, 1986:

  Mohamad Qital, a technical engineer from Surayaba Technical Institute. He was particularly skilled in weapons training and manufacture and was one of those who moved to Mindanao to train Indonesians after 1996. He is believed to head the wakalah for East Java and remains at large.

  Mustopa (Mustafa), original name, Pranata Yudha; head of Mantiqi III, arrested in July 2003 outside Jakarta. His father was a general in the Indonesian army. Nasir Abbas, a Malaysian detained in April 2003, was his deputy.

  Mustaqim, a Klaten native who once taught at Ngruki. He reappeared in Mindanao in 1998 as head of the Islamic Military Academy and is still at large. He was, and perhaps still is, a teacher at Pesantren Dar us-Syahada in Boyolali.

  Thoriqudin alias Hamzah alias Abu Rusdan, arrested April 2003, son of Haji Moh. Faleh of Kudus, a Darul Islam leader who was arrested for alleged Komando Jihad activities in the early 1980s. Thoriqudin is suspected of being Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’s replacement as head of JI. Studied at Universitas Negeri Solo and is an explosives expert.

  Suyono alias Abu Farauk, arrested in July 2003, then released. Believed to be head of JI’s wakalah Lampung.

  Muchlas alias Ali Gufron, one of the main suspects in the Bali bombing. Others in this group include the thirteen who went with Ahmad Sajuli, an Indonesian from Jakarta who is currently detained in Malaysia. The group was recruited by a Jakarta-based Darul Islam leader named Ahmad Furzon alias Broto, who was close to the DI head, Ajengan Masduki.31

Mohammad Aslam bin Yar Ali Khan, the Singaporean detained by the Northern Alliance in 2001, whose activities provided the key to the arrests of other JI members by Singapore, was in Afghanistan in 1986 but it is not known which camp he was in or whether he had any connection with the Sungkar group.

3. The third class, 1987:

  Hambali, chief strategist of JI and former

31 The group included Abdul Salam, Lukman, Saiful, Jahe, Abdul Hakim, Hisbullah, from West Kalimantan, Musohan, and Hasan Abdullah (Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’s son in- law).

leader of Mantiqi I, arrested in Thailand on approximately 15 August 2003, has been implicated in virtually every major criminal act undertaken by JI.

  Muchliansyah alias Solihin, came back to Indonesia with Abu Bakar Ba’asyir in 1999 and moved to Pulau Baru, Kalimantan. He was arrested in August 2003.

  Fihirudin alias Moh Iqbal alias Abu Jibril, detained in Malaysia from June 2001, his deportation to Indonesia was imminent as this report went to press in late August 2003.

  Jabir alias Enjang Bastaman (killed in West Java Christmas Eve bombings of 2000. His father had been a Darul Islam fighter, and his brother had been imprisoned for Komando Jihad.

  Muklis Yunos of the MILF likely made contact with some of the Indonesians around this time, because he returned to the Philippines permanently in 1987 and was in Pakistan just before his return.

4. The fourth class, late 1987:

  Usman alias Abbas alias Edy Setiono, detained for the August 2001 bombing of the Atrium shopping mall in Jakarta, also involved in the bombing of the home of the Philippines ambassador to Jakarta, and the Christmas Eve bombings.

 Asep Danu, the son of Haji Danu Muh Hasan. The father had been one of the key DI/Komando Jihad figures, widely believed to have been in the employ of Indonesian intelligence or at least used by it; the son left training early, because he did not want to be under the coordination of the Sungkar group.

 Nasir Abbas, who reportedly “graduated” at the top of his class, was Mustafa/Mustopa’s deputy in Mantiqi III and arrested in April 2003.

 Firdaus alias Ahmad Azzam, arrested in Jakarta July 2003, accused of involvement in smuggling ammunition to Poso. Active as volunteer in the Islamic medical aid organisation Mer-C.

 Zuhroni alias Nuim, explosives expert involved in sending recruits to wage jihad in Maluku. Still at large.

 Farihin, married to the daughter of a DI leader from Cirebon; was detained in Palu, Central Sulawesi, in October 2002 for smuggling ammunition to be used in the Poso conflict. This group also likely included:32

  Arkam/Arqom alias Haris alias Azmi, a native of Sumbawa, who had a permanent resident card from Sabah. He became a military trainer in Afghanistan, specialising in sharpshooting, but by 1993 was back in Malaysia as part of the Sungkar group.

  Iswandi, an Acehnese. One of the names used by “Polem”, the Acehnese involved in the Medan Christmas Eve bombings of 2000 was Iswandi but it is not clear if this is the same person.

  Ali, an Indonesian who became an instructor, reportedly close to Hambali. By this time, cadres from the first three groups had become instructors, and Zulkarnaen was head of the academy. The Indonesians were very proud that all instructors for the South East Asia contingent were their compatriots. The Moros, the veterans said, never did as well as the Indonesians, who even were asked to teach in other qabilahs. 5. The Fifth and Sixth Classes, 1988, 1990: The fifth class entered in 1988. No one was sent in 1989 because of the political situation in Pakistan. The sixth class, which left in 1990, included:

  Dedi Mulyadi, detained in connection with Christmas Eve 2000 bombings in Ciamis, West Java.

  Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi, involved in the August 2000 bombing of the Philippine ambassador’s residence and the Rizal Day bombing in Manila on 30 December 2000. Arrested in Manila in January 2002, sentenced to seventeen years, escaped in 32 ICG knows that they were in Afghanistan at this time, but it is not clear when they arrived. Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: IRS Asia Report N°63, 26 August 2003 Page 9 July 2003 and still at large.

  Ali Imron, involved in Bali bombings, left Indonesia with al-Ghozi.

  Utomo Pamungkas alias Mubarok, teacher at Pesantren al-Islam, Lamongan; installed as head of the Menado wakalah of JI in 1998, under Mustopa; involved in 2000 Christmas Eve bombings in Mojokerto, East Java, and the 2002 Bali bombings.

  Dul Matin alias Joko Pitono, involved in bombing of the Philippine ambassador’s home, and the Christmas Eve and Bali bombings.

  Holis, West Java Christmas Eve bomber who got away. He took a three-month “short course” in Afghanistan, not the full three years.

  Akim Akimuddin alias Suheb, Bandung Christmas Eve bomber, killed in the premature explosion of that bomb.

  Usaid alias Zainal Arifin alias Suwarso alias Saklo, suspected of involvement in Christmas Eve 2000 bombings in Mataram, Lombok, together with Dul Matin. Native of Karanganyar, Solo, he married a woman from Bima, Sumbawa and reportedly died in Maluku. According to the interrogation of al-Ghozi, it was he who recruited al-Ghozi into JI, together with another man known as Jamaluddin (however, al-Ghozi depositions always mix fact and fiction).

  Muchtar Daeng Lao alias Abu Urwah, head of the military committee for Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, arrested in the December 2002 bombings in Makassar.

  Kahar Mustafa, provided explosives for the Makassar bombings.

  Syarifuddin alias Abu Jamiah, commander of the military wing of a   Makassar-based organisation, Wahdah Islamiyah.

  Basyir alias Abu Mukhlisun, Ngruki graduate, Afghanistan veteran, instructor in Mindanao. 6. The last three-year class entered in 1991 and “graduated” in 1994. There were also many JI members who trained for shorter periods between 1993 and 1995. The training shifted to Mindanao sometime in 1996. The following people left for Afghanistan in 1991:

  Umar Besar alias Abdul Ghoni, involvedin the Bali bombings.

 Abdul Aziz alias Imam Samudra alias

 Kudama, key figure in several JI actions; stayed seven months only.

  Faiz Abu Bakar Bafana, detained in Singapore, involved in Christmas Eve 2000 bombings in Batam and Rizal Day bombings in Manila.

  Suheimi, detained in Malaysia in December 2001, alleged member of Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM).

  Jamsari, detained in Malaysia.

  Jafar bin Mistooki, Singaporean, in Afghanistan one year only, 1991-1992.

  Agus, detained in Singapore, in Afghanistan for full three years.

  Abdul Razak alias Farouk, detained in Malaysia, completed three years.

  Samsudin, detained in Malaysia.

  Moh. Jauhari bin Abdullah, detained in Singapore, stayed five months.

  Fathi Abu Bakar Bafana, brother of Faiz, stayed five months.

  Abu Yusuf alias Dadang Suratman born West Java, permanent resident of Malaysia, stayed five months in Afghanistan.

  Abbas, father of Hasyim, father-in-law of Mukhlas.

  Hasyim bin Abbas, Singaporean, stayed in Afghanistan five months.

  Halim bin Hussein, Singaporean, joined jihad in Maluku in 2000

  Sarjiyo alias Sawwad arrested April 2003, involved in 2000 Christmas Eve bombings in Mojokerto, East Java.

  Aris Munandar of KOMPAK-Solo, a Ngruki alumnus and classmate of Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi, producer of recruiting videos on Ambon and Poso.

  Asep alias Darwin, involved in Atrium Mall bombing.

  Muhajir, younger brother of Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi, involved in Mojokerto bombings with Sarjiyo, above. A few non-Indonesians associated with JI were still arriving in Afghanistan from 1993 to 1995. They included:

  Mas Slamet Kastari, head of the Singapore wakalah, who went in 1993;

Zulkarnaen was still head of the academy at the time. The arrivals also included a group of Singaporeans, all now detained, who went for between two and nine months in 1994.33

  Taufik bin Abdul Halim alias Dani, the Malaysian injured in and arrested for the bombing of the Atrium shopping mall in Jakarta in August 2001.

Taufik has a particularly interesting history in Afghanistan, not only because he was one of the last arrivals before the Taliban took power, but also because he moved among at least three different camps. If his interrogation deposition is accurate, he arrived in Pakistan in 1993. In April 1994, he moved to “Camp Taibah” in Kunar for two weeks of firearms training. This may have been a camp set up by a Pakistani group called Markaz Da’wat-ul Irshad, which in 1993 established an armed wing, the Lashkar-i-Tayyeba, that is one of the groups since active in the violence in Kashmir. But one of its training camps was in Kunar and designed to train mujahidin from around the world.34 In August 1995, he moved to Khost (exact location not clear) for three months of artillery training, then to Camp Khaldan, the most famous of the al-Qaeda

33 Mahfudz, Sobrani, H. Ibrahim bin Maidi, Moh. Nazir bin Mohammed Uthman alias Hameed, Mohamed Ellias (also seen as Elyas and Ilyas) alias Moh. Khan alias Deedat, Moh. Khalim bin Jaffar (Singaporean of Javanese descent), Rafi alias Yusuf, Husaini alias Iqbal, Syahrudi, and Rasyid.

34 Dr. Yoginder Sikand ,“Militancy in Kashmir: The Case of the Lashkar-i-Tayyeba”, reproduced on www. peacemonger.com/edition4/features.htm.

camps, for two weeks of anti-tank training. He was arrested on his return to Pakistan in February 1996 for not having proper travel documentation but he was released in October and returned to Malaysia.35 The shift to training in the Philippines in 1996 did not mean severing connections with Afghanistan. In 1998, JI paid for Mas Slamet bin Kastari and Jafar bin Mistooki from Singapore to visit Afghanistan for a month to look at the Taliban system of government. They returned home, deeply impressed.  At the beginning of 1999, Faiz Abu Bakar Bafana and Hambali accompanied two Malaysian men, Zaini and Zamzuri, to Kandahar; Faiz and Hambali returned to Malaysia after two weeks, leaving the Malaysians for additional military training.36 Also in 1999, Singaporean Khalim bin Jaffar returned to Afghanistan for training, where he met Mohamed Atef, the late al-Qaeda military commander.37

In June 1999, Zulkarnaen called a meeting of the Afghan alumni, at an Islamic institute in Solo, his home base, at which he reminded them not to forget that they had gone for training in order to wage jihad. It was at this meeting that some of the early and later alumni appear to have met one another and joined forces.38 From April to August 2000, Hambali arranged for firearms and explosives training for Thoriqudin alias Hamzah alias Abu Rusdan; Agus; Amran alias Henry bin Mansur (involved in the Christmas Eve 2000 bombings in Batam); and Jafar bin Mistooki. At the same time, Dr Azahari, one of those wanted in the Bali bombings, was given special explosives training.

35 Berita Acara Pemeriksaan Taufik bin Abdul Halim alias Dany, 27 November 2002, p.3

36 Interrogation deposition of Faiz Abu Bakar Bafana, 22 October 2002, in case dossier of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir.

37 Republic of Singapore, “White Paper on The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism”, Singapore, 7 January 2003, p. 12.

38 Interrogation deposition of Ali Imron in Abdul Jabar case, 26 February 2003. Ali Imron says the meeting took place before the violence in Ambon broke out, but in fact it  was afterwards. A source from Indonesia’s National Intelligence Agency said the group was known as G272 to reflect the fact that there were 272 Afghan veterans in all. See “Bomb organizers fought in Afghanistan”, The Age, 3 December 2002.

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